Robert La Follette, running on the progressive platform, made a good showing in 1924; he gained 5,000,000 votes, one sixth of the total votes cast.7 But in the following years, protest politics declined and the CPPA disintegrated. By the time of the 1928 presidential election Americans had little to choose from in the contest between Alfred A. Smith and Herbert Hoover. John Dewey made the acquaintance of Smith that year and decided to back him.8 He later acknowledged that the intrinsic ties to the financial world on the part of both parties reduced their difference to insignificance, for both served the interests of big business.9
Dewey consistently allied himself with every effort to educate the public about the economic and political realities of the times-even prior to the market crash of 1929-for only as so equipped could collective public intelligence become an operational force in self-determination. Such groups as the LIPA and the PL were not political parties but educational organizations attempting to give direction to inchoate sentiments aroused in times of crisis.
Dewey was not one of the original group of political dissidents who, after the election of Hoover in 1928, sought to organize a new party along progressive lines.10 Yet the inspiration and philosophy behind the organization was provided by Dewey's The Public and Its Problems (1927) ." After the election, in December, the Nation pointed out the bankruptcy of both parties calling for a new political effort. Neither of the major parties was prepared to address itself to the problems of economic reorganization, and the major role of the new party would be to sponsor long-term industrial and economic reform. Paul H. Douglas, an economist from the University of Chicago, organized the LIPA in the summer of 1929 as the educational and directive nucleus of a radical new party.
Dewey observed that the progressive sentiment-so much a part of American political life-was neither dead nor sleeping, but diffused. As unorganized it was impotent; the LIPA offered itself as the clearing house for independent radical groups in the work to create an effective third party. What liberals needed, he urged, was a set of principles, primarily economic, around which to rally.12 Dewey served as the LIPA's chairman and its national committee boasted the membership of such renowns as Stuart Chase, Oswald Garrison Villard, Harry Laidler, and Reinhold Niebuhr. 13 Throughout 1930, the LIPA undertook a massive educational and organizational campaign. Dewey, lending the support of his great name, signed form letters appealing for membership, and during the first nine months of its existence the LIPA gained 2,500 members. In the 1930 elections, the LIPA supported and successfully ran several independents for office. The League was encouraged by the election of Farm-Laborites in Minnesota, as governor and United States Senator.14 With these successes behind it, the LIPA sought to persuade the progressive block in Congress to openly support a new third party organized along a progressive economic program.
Dewey, as national chairman of the LIPA, wrote an open letter to Senator George Norris on December 25, 1930, urging him to "renounce both of these old parties and to help give birth to a new party based upon the principles of planning and control for the purpose of building happier lives, a more just society and that peaceful world which was the dream of Him whose birthday we celebrate this Christmas Day?"15 Dewey estimated that Norris might be more vulnerable to such a suggestion at this time, for in the November election, the executive director of the Republican National Committee, Robert H. Lucas, had stated that "Senator Norris did not belong to the Republican party as the latter was 'too socially minded'."16 Lucas had actually spent money and issued literature in an attempt to prevent Norris from winning the senatorial race in Nebraska.
Dewey wrote that he had been informed by senators and representatives of both parties that "the formation of a third party" is inevitable and "predicted that it could win the Presidency by 1940."17 Dewey advised Norris that the Republican party was committed to laissez-faire and "rugged individualism," whereas "you stand for social planning and social control." "New wine can't be put in old bottles," so Norris should defect and join a new party, for "the new political philosophy needs it own incarnation."18 Norris, however, declined; he planned to remain at least a nominal Republican, despite the fact that he had openly supported Smith over Hoover who, he believed, had turned the country over to "power trust."19 He preferred to put his trust in independent voting rather than to form a new party. John Dewey responded; in an address delivered on December 30, 1930, before the New History Society at the Community Church located on Park Avenue at Thirty-fourth Street (2,000 were in attendance), he denounced Republican insurgents, like Norris and Borah, who were waiting for "a tide on which they can ride without having to take risks. It is too bad they lack courage." They fail to see how ripe the time is for a third party, for "just as the Republican Party was born in the irrepressible conflict against the extension of chattel slavery, so the new party will be born to liberate us from the enslavement of governmental agencies to selfish and predatory interest."20 This exchange, although it brought the LIPA third-party agitation into the public eye, tended to alienate congressional progressives who, consequently, declined to invite the LIPA membership to participate in the 1931 Conference of Progressives. Nonetheless, the publicity paid off; early in 1931 The New Republic announced enthusiastic support for LIPA aims. Dewey was asked to write a series of articles explaining its programs. They appeared in March and April in four consecutive articles.
Both major parties, Dewey declared,-the parties of Jefferson and Lincoln-are philosophically anachronistic but even more are irretrievably tied to the interests of business and finance. It would be close to magic, he suggested, to expect "that those with privilege will voluntarily remedy the breakdown they have created."21 The government is not in the hands of the people but in the hands of the captains of industry. They control the government as well as utilities and the press but while they rule, they do not govern. The words above reveal that Dewey never dogmatized his belief in voluntary, social cooperation; the implicit suggestion is that irresponsible business must, if needs be, be forced to give up its privileges.
Since both parties subserve the interests of finance-capital, a new radical party concerned with returning control of the government to the people is desperately needed. The American middle class, the traditional seat of progressive sentiment and idealism, is waiting for direction. Neither the Socialists, the Communists, nor the older parties are congenial to this progressivism; nor are they interested in changing the present order, at least in the characteristically American way.
Policies of the last fifty years reveal that politics has been concerned with production, not consumption. Piecemeal reform will get us nowhere; we need, he urged, to perform an about-face and to reorganize along totally different lines.22 In articulating the policies for the new party, he recommended a planned economy with the possible socialization of utilities, power, banking, and credit. By this he meant governmental control and perhaps even ownership if it seemed necessary. He also advised the government regulation of the radio and press, and advocated the taxation of land value.23
Throughout 1931, Dewey continually attacked the inactivity of the Hoover administration through the People's Lobby Bulletin. In May, he demonstrated the gross inequities of the present economic order by showing that eighty percent of the nation's wealth belonged to four percent of the population. As a solution he urged a sharp increase in the taxation of the higher brackets to pay for relief programs. He counseled Hoover to call a special session of Congress to handle the growing social and economic problems of the Depression. When Hoover, unconvinced of the seriousness of the depression, rejected the proposal to call such a session to deal with unemployment, saying we can't legislate ourselves out of trouble, Dewey hastened to point out the relief potential of unemployment insurance and public works. Is it, Dewey asked, that Hoover is afraid to tax the rich friends who gave funds to his campaign? 24 At this time, Dewey also had critical words for the Congressional Progressives who had held their Conference of Progressives in Washington in March (and who had not invited the LIPA). They had failed to exert sufficient force on the administration in demanding a special session of Congress on unemployment. He reminded Robert La Follette of his 1924 progressive pledge and urged him to fight for them now.
Dewey, however, was more incensed with Hoover's seeming indifference and insensitivity to the deprivation and suffering all across the country. With ten million Americans unemployed, Hoover's dismissal of the depression as transitory was the height of blind devotion to the system of special privilege and contempt for labor. Hoover's tive committee decided to endorse Norman Thomas for president. The LIPA developed, however, the most comprehensive platform offered by any political group-a platform "reminiscent of the Populist, Bull Moose, and 1924 Progressive platform."27 It was bolder and went further than the New Deal; called the Four-Year Presidential Plan, it asked for three to five million dollars for public works and $250,000,000 for direct relief annually. The plan called for an increase in taxation on higher-bracket incomes, and recommended larger corporation and inheritance taxes; in addition, the plan advocated the establishment of worker's insurance, old age pension, the abolition of child labor, and a six-hour work day. The program supported public ownership of power, utilities, coal, oil, the railroad, and advocated a reduction of the tariff rates and aid to farmers. On the international scene, the LIPA platform urged United States participation in the League of Nations, the World Court, and recognition of Russia.
As the national chairman of the LIPA, it would not be presumptuous to suggest that Dewey had some influence in the formation of this platform. Certainly he gave his adherence to its policies for he continued to advocate them throughout the Depression. The only qualification he was likely to make would probably have pertained to American participation in the League and World Court. We have never discovered any retraction of his earlier rejection of the League and World Court; on the contrary statements have been found that demonstrate that as late as 1945 he still refused to accept any international organization formed solely for political as opposed to economic purposes.28 The LIPA platform offered the American public "a more practical and practicable form of idealism" than any other political organization of the day and was by and large the most comprehensive.2 Although the LIPA decided to back the Socialist Party, they voted 47 to 8 not to support any communist candidates, for their aims and methods were not congenial to the American progressive tradition; the LIPA fancied itself the organ of that practical idealism, attempting to give it expression and direction.
Dewey predicted, as the elections drew near, that many votes for Roosevelt would in reality be votes against Hoover.30 Many independents hesitated to vote outside the Democratic Party lest they thereby aid the cause of Hoover. As a result, Roosevelt won by a landslide, with Norman Thomas polling only 884,781 votes-two percent of the total votes cast. However, Dewey was not disspirited by the out- The national chairman of the League for Independent Political Action could not let this criticism pass. Dewey admitted the need for a new, strong political philosophy, but he seriously doubted that the Socialist Party "alone" could supply it. To attack the LIPA as weak in commitment showed, he thought, some grave misunderstanding of its aims and philosophy. First, he pointed out, the LIPA is not a political party but an organization seeking to unite dissident groups so as to present a united front in the formation of a third party. The LIPA's philosophy is not a watered down socialism as Thomas had charged, but an expression of the American democratic faith, believing that the direction of political action must be dictated by the social conditions and needs of the time. As such, its program is tentative and experimental, but nonetheless definite; it too espouses the socialization of production and distribution, since this is clearly a need of the times. To achieve such goals, however, the LIPA knows very well that it needs power which can be had only through concerted dissident political action.34 Instead of attacking various liberal groups, like the LIPA and the middle class in general, Thomas and the Socialist Party ought to work for unity; Dewey urged Thomas to join with the LIPA and other progressive and radical groups in 1933. These same criticisms that Dewey directed at the Socialists, he repeated against proponents of Marxism. In response to Reinhold Niebuhr, Dewey rejected such dogmatic schemes as foreign to the experimental temper, for constructive reorganization must be partial and tentative; definiteness and decisiveness are not alien to such a method, for it can as easily support deep commitment and radical political action as can the Marxist ideology. 35 By March 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed leadership of his depressed country, economic collapse had reached high tide. The Hoover administration, turning a deaf ear to pleas for direct relief for the mass of unemployed, had sought rather to revive the economy by granting financial aid to business. Dewey, as President of the People's Lobby, had from the beginning held that the key to recovery lay in the purchasing power of the people and for that reason had supported unemployment insurance and public works.36 It became immediately apparent that only a change of leadership in Washington-to one sympathetic to these needs-could force these programs into legislation, since it was only too obvious that financial and industrial leaders would not willingly surrender their privileges; they would have to be restrained by the government and the first step in that direction was to force them to pay higher taxes:
Our entire history and experience proves that the financial and industrial leaders of the nation will not make these changes voluntarily-they will not, except under compulsion, surrender their most profitable share of a system which has concentrated four-fifths of the nation's wealth in the hands of one twenty-fifths of the people.
The Federal Government alone has the power to force the wealthy owners of the nation to surrender their control over the lives and destinies of the overwhelming majority of the American people and the first step is to compel them to pay taxes commensurate in sacrifice, with that of people with very small incomes.37 (Dewey's emphasis) Since the Democratic Party was anchored to financial interests as much as the Republican Party, Roosevelt's New Deal would have to be compromised. Despite the improvements that were beginning to be felt in May, two months after his inauguration, the LIPA officials still remained skeptical, but the rank and file members marveled at the emergency measures Roosevelt managed to push through the special session of Congress he had immediately called. Dewey, writing in Common Sense, which had become "the official organ of the League," warned that Rooseveltian measures "are both somewhat blind and halfhearted, and their chief desire is to bolster and repair the present systemwhich means as sure as night follows day an ultimate return of complete power and rule to the very elements that have brought the nation to its present pass."38 League officials were not appeased by Roosevelt's efforts, although they did recognize and applaud his successes. They were convinced he had compromised too easily with the older order. Hence, they thought the need for a new radical third party was imperative. and "only a new system which destroys the profit system can banish poverty and bring to the American people the economic liberation which modern science and technology is prepared to bestow upon them." For Dewey, Roosevelt could succeed only if he abandoned the Democratic Party; in this eventuality "it is urgent that we propagate our program and organize so that Roosevelt may be supported when he is on the right side," but if he should fail, we must be prepared to offer "an alternative to fascism."42 Throughout 1933-34, Dewey continued to call for more radical political action than the New Deal offered. When the farm strikes occurred in the fall of 1933, as president of the People's Lobby, he wrote an open letter to President Roosevelt noting that "a reduction in mortgage debts and interest rates somewhat proportional to the reduction in prices of farm land seems imperatively needed."43 Indeed the Agriculture Adjustment Act, signed by Roosevelt in May to avert a strike offered some relief but not enough. After the October violence Roosevelt sent Henry Wallace, then Secretary of Agriculture, and Hugh Johnson, National Recovery Administrator, to the Midwest to mollify the farmers. By December, through increased loans and cash benefits, the farm strike was quelled. But discontent did work to increase third-party possibilities in the Midwest. For Dewey, Roosevelt's action consisted in merely treating symptoms, not causes. He advised that the sales tax, enacted under Hoover, be repealed; farm processing taxes and other consumer taxes put the burden where it hurt the most, on the depressed consumer. Dewey urged a revision of the Revenue Act to tax harder the higher income brackets.44 As far as he could see, Dewey thought Roosevelt was continuing Hoover's policy of aiding finance and business with little regard for the masses. The simplest way to remedy the situation, he proposed, was through higher taxes on higher incomes to support social relief programs.45
The president of the People's Lobby criticized the manner in which the Roosevelt administration sought to raise revenues for the public works and unemployment relief that had been enacted. Next year's budget, Dewey suggested, would have to come close to ten billion-where will the money come from? The government will sell bonds at 4% interest, over a twenty-five year period. If some financiers, he argued, can afford to buy bonds, they can be taxed more heavily. The government's method enables the wealthy to increase their wealth at the expense of the poor.46 Dewey noted that the role of the government today has changed drastically from previous periods; no longer is its function merely that of a policeman. Now it must play the role of provider.47 To insure this role, the people through their government must take over the basic agencies on which industry and commerce depend. He recommended the socialization of banks, railroads, power companies, mines, and oil. Certainly, the Roosevelt administration, much more so than that of Hoover, has taken steps in that direction; but there can be no compromises with the old system. We cannot trust to halfway measures, but need a radical reorientation, Nonetheless, the FLPF thought the time was ripe for the formation of the long awaited third party; they feared delay might allow some other independent group the opportunity to initiate the party in a way to be divisive. The FLPF first looked to enlist the support of congressional progressives but this effort was no more successful than Dewey's 1930 attempt to engage Norris' support. The progressives were united in their views on legislative policy but each was too much of a leader to be a follower. Middle West leaders, Amlie and Williams, were able to induce support from Farmer-Labor groups there; a conference was called in Chicago, July 5, and 6, 1935. The response was excellent-all radical groups attending, except for the communists. However, instead of creating a new party, another organization-again so as to be most inclusive in uniting contending groups-was formed: The American Commonwealth Political Federation. The platform adopted was consistent with proposals urged by Midwestern groups since the 1890's. Generally, most members were encouraged about the possibilities for 1936, although few thought the new party could gain control of the presidency; but a powerful showing could be used to pressure the administration in certain LIPA directions. Howard Y. Williams, FLPF leader in Wisconsin, was confident that by 1940 the new party could be in control and Dewey agreed.52
Despite these initially auspicious conditions, difficulties arose over the feasibility of running a presidential candidate in 1936 under the third-party banner. Some thought the candidates should be restricted to state and congressional offices. It was feared that a poor showing in the presidential race might ruin, for good, third-party possibilities in the future. When the newly formed ACPF moved to have the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party call for a third-party convention, Governor Olson was undecided about running a presidential nominee, for he feared a failure in 1936 would cripple third-party efforts for subsequent years. Olson was ambivalent at first, saying he would leave the decision up to the convention-then he reneged. It seems he had been making deals with Roosevelt behind the scenes and as the convention drew nearer early in May, he publicly counseled his party to boycott the convention if a presidential candidate were voted. He feared a thirdparty presidential candidate would aid Republicans by dividing liberals; this action proved so divisive as to knock the wind out of the sails of the convention before it even met on May 30, in Chicago.
What had promised to be one of the most energetic and best organized third-party movements in American history was deflected by factionalism. But there were other oppositional forces that played a part in dividing third-party efforts before they could congeal. The agrarian leader, Milo Reno-an avid third party promoter-died early in May; again as with Olson, some feared a third party might 52Ibid., 93.
